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This impressive volume crowns the life's work
of two of America's leading international law-
yers and international legal process theorists,
Harvard Law School Professor Abram Chayes,
formerly legal adviser to the U.S. Department
of State, and Antonia Handler Chayes, presi-
dent of the Consensus Building Institute and
former undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force.
The book grows out of the Chayeses' vast practi-
cal experience, as well as their extensive teach-
ing and writing about the architecture of inter-
national regimes and treaty compliance in the
arms control and environmental fields. Their
book seeks to describe how international regula-
tion is accomplished through "treaty regimes,"
and to prescribe how those regimes may be bet-
ter managed to promote greater compliance
with treaty norms.
The opening chapter, "A Theory of Compli-
ance," posits that three factors-efficiency, na-
tional interest and regime norms-foster a gen-
eral propensity for nation-states to comply with
treaty rules. Why, then, do nations deviate from
those rules? The Chayeses explain noncompli-
ance as stemming from the ambiguity and inde-
terminacy of treaty language, limitations on the
capacity of parties to carry out their treaty un-
dertakings, and time lags between a state's un-
dertaking and its performance. Given these
pressures toward noncompliance, how can devi-
ance be contained within acceptable levels? In
parts 1 and 2, the authors derive and contrast
two strategies for promoting treaty compliance.
Part 1 develops an "enforcement" model, and
after reviewing the various available coercive de-
vices-treaty-based military and economic sanc-
tions, membership, and unilateral sanctions-
finds this approach largely doomed to failure.
Sanctioning authority, the authors argue, "is
rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when
granted, and likely to be ineffective when used"
(pp. 32-33). Repeated use of sanctions entails
high costs to the sanctioner and generally re-
quires great-power leadership, which can only
rarely be mustered. Consequently, sanctions are
applied sporadically and unevenly, creating seri-
ous problems of legitimacy.
After discrediting the coercive model, part
2 offers in its stead a "management" model,
whereby national actors seek to induce compli-
ance not through coercive strategies, but
through a cooperative, managerial approach
whose centerpiece is an interactive process of
justification, discourse and persuasion. The
Chayeses describe a regime not as a passive
"switching system, facilitating the independent
interactions of independent states," but as play-
ing an "active role . . . in modifying prefer-
ences, generating new options, persuading the
parties to move toward increasing compliance
with regime norms, and guiding the evolution
of the normative structure in the direction of
the overall objectives of the regime" (p. 229).
Chapters 5 through 10 identify and assess the
essential tools of this normative framework:
ranging from devices such as transparency,
norms and strategic interaction, reporting and
data collection, and verification and monitor-
ing, to "instruments of active management"
such as dispute settlement, capacity building,
jawboning, interpretation, and strategic policy
review and assessment. The final two chapters
evaluate institutions, both nongovernmental
and intergovernmental, and argue that a man-
agement model will render such institutions
more effective instruments of managing treaty
compliance.
The Chayeses' book is a classic of interna-
tional legal process. It is the most insightful and
complete description available of the trans-sub-
stantive role that law plays in the international
regulatory process. The book bristles with exam-
ples, many drawn from the Chayeses' rich expe-
riential base as government and private lawyers.
The authors support their arguments with myr-
iad mini-case studies, cutting across the tradi-
tional realms of both private and public interna-
tional law: use of force, economic sanctions, in-
terational trade, environmental law, maritime
law, international transport and communica-
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tions, human rights, nuclear nonproliferation,
arms control, expropriation, international com-
modity agreements, labor and sovereign debt.
Helpful as these examples are, their kaleido-
scopic range tends to disorient a reader seeking
clear answers to three fimdamental questions.
First, what precisely are the contours of the
"new sovereignty"? The authors suggest that
sovereignty now means not freedom from exter-
nal interference, but freedom to engage in inter-
national relations as members of international
regimes. A state's sovereignty thus becomes con-
tingent upon its ongoing web of intemational
ties and obligations. No state can blithely ignore
international norms because "there are too
many audiences, foreign and domestic, too
many relationships present and potential, too
many linkages to other issues to be ignored"
(p. 119). The new sovereignty thus primarily
consists not of territorial control or governmen-
tal autonomy, but of "status-the vindication
of the state's existence as a member of the inter-
national system" (p. 27). "[N]o single country,
no matter how powerful, can consistently
achieve its objectives through unilateral action
orad hoc coalition" (p. 123), the Chayeses aver.
"[I]n the last analysis, the ability of a state to
remain a participant in the international policy-
making process-and thus its status as a mem-
ber of the international system-depends in
some degree on its demonstrated willingness to
accept and engage the regime's compliance
procedures" (p. 230)."
The second question, given the bounded
nature of this new sovereignty, is, how pre-
cisely should treaty regimes "manage" state
compliance with international law? To the
Chayeses, the principal method of induding
compliance with regime norms is "jawbon-
ing"--an "iterative process" of 'justificatory
discourse" among regime members-not the
imposition of sanctions (p. 25). This answer
strongly evokes Abram Chayes's classic of do-
mestic legal process, The Role of the Judge in Pub-
lic Law Litigation,' which argued that domestic
litigation in the United States had shifted
from a retrospective, private-law paradigm
into a prospective, public-law mode. Within
the new paradigm, the judge sheds her passive
and blinkered umpireal role in favor of an
open-ended, managerial role, interpreting
constitutive text, demanding and receiving in-
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formation, declaring norms, and using broad
and equitable supervisory tools to persuade
and prod the parties into legal compliance.
The New Sovereignty argues that the treaty re-
gime has assumed a similar managerial role with
regard to the compliance of its member states.
Like public-law litigation and the judges who
manage it, "[t]he [regulatory] treaty and the
regime in which it is embedded are best seen
not as a set of prohibitory norms, but as institu-
tions for management of an issue area over
time" (p. 228). Like the public-law judge, the
treaty regime's prime tool is the power to per-
suade, using norms and legal powers as leverage
points and bargaining chips in a discursive,
norm-creating process. In both cases, the over-
seer of legal process-the judge in domestic
litigation and the treaty regime in international
regulation-manages an interactive, dialectic
process of justificatory discourse, in which
norms are invoked, interpreted and elaborated
in a way that generates pressure for compliance.
But third, what does it really mean to have a
"discourse among states, international organi-
zations, and to some extent interested publics,
elaborating the meaning of [treaty] norms"
(p. 110)? The authors portray the "interactive
process for dealing with compliance" as pro-
ceeding in several stages: (1) development of
data about the situation and parties under regu-
lation; (2) identification of behavior that raises
significant compliance questions; (3) diagnosis
of the sources of apparently deviant behavior;
(4) examination of the noncomplying party's
capacity to carry out its obligations; (5) offers
of technical assistance to redress any underca-
pacity; (6) the threat or invocation of dispute-
settlement mechanisms; and (7) sometimes, the
conclusion that the treaty norms themselves
should be modified to accommodate the non-
compliant conduct.
On reflection, this description seems correct,
but incomplete, in two major respects: First, the
book does not entirely persuade with regard
to either the carrots or the sticks that give the
managerial process its effectiveness. By focusing
so intensely on process, the Chayeses only lightly
discuss the substance of the rules being enforced.
Yet all treaties are not created equal. States may
have greater incentives to comply with some
treaties, but greater obligations to comply with
others (e.g., those enforcing jus cogens norms).
Securing greater compliance with treaties is not
good per se. In fact, securing compliance may
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not be so desirable if the treaties themselves
are unfair or enshrine disingenuous or coercive
bargains.
The authors concede that the "legitimacy"
of their managerial approach depends on pro-
cedural fairness, equal and nondiscriminatory
application, and the substantive fairness and eq-
uity of the rules being applied. They acknowl-
edge that "fairness considerations can hardly
fail to play a major role in [the discursive] pro-
cess" (pp. 127-34). But what remains unspeci-
fied is precisely how the process should account
for such fairness considerations, by what means
managerial processes can be adjusted to im-
prove compliance with underenforced treaties
with which states may have low incentives to
comply (e.g., human rights treaties), and by
what means unfair or illegitimate regime norms
should be rendered unenforceable.
Similarly, by emphasizing the power of the
managerial model and the weaknesses of the
enforcement model, the Chayeses create the
misimpression that the two are alternatives,
when in fact they complement one another.
The authors' case studies do not clarify the ex-
tent to which the managerial model sometimes
succeeds not solely because of the power of dis-
course but also because of the shadow of sanc-
tions, however rare or remote that possibility
might be.
Second, the authors' picture of process omits
any detailed description of how the member
states internalize the constraining norms. It says
nothing about the means-for example, judi-
cial incorporation, legislative embodiment or
executive acceptance-by which a complying
state will signal its internal acceptance of the
relevant international standard. Although the
Chayeses are themselves experts on the nature
and functioning of domestic courts, ironically,
their discussion of the "instruments of active
management" says nothing about the role that
domestic courts-for example, the U.S. courts
construing the Alien Tort Statute since the land-
mark decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala2-can
play as enforcers and internalizers of interna-
tional norms. As the authors recognize, the pro-
cess of treaty compliance transpires in a two-
level game, in which a member's relations with
its treaty partners occur on one chessboard,
2 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (Paraguayan human
rights victims may sue Paraguayan official under the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350, in United States
court for civil damages arising from official torture).
while its bargaining about compliance with its
internal domestic constituencies transpires on
a domestic chessboard. Yet the Chayeses do not
closely examine how the transnational legal link
between the domestic and international levels
operates, even though it is that very link that
often determines whether the "managerial pro-
cess" -interstate bargaining at the global
level-will actually reshape the national inter-
ests and identities of the participants.
Their failure to discuss internalization also
leads the Chayeses to avoid explaining how their
insights might be applied outside the realm of
positive, treaty-based law to the vast and growing
realm of customary and declarative interna-
tional law. In the human rights area, for exam-
ple, the Chayeses recognize that their manage-
rial strategy has little compliance "bite," given
that treaty regimes are notoriously weak and
governments, for reasons of trade or Realpolitik,
may hesitate formally and openly to declare that
another government has engaged in human
rights abuse. Yet human rights is an area in
which core customary norms are clearly defined
and often absolute. In such an area, the best
compliance strategies may not be the kind of
"horizontal" strategies of regime management
at the international level that the Chayeses de-
scribe but, rather, strategies of internalization.
Examples of the latter might include domestic
litigation to provoke judicial incorporation of
human rights norms, or lobbying to embed the
treaty norms into binding domestic statutes that
officials of the noncomplying government
might be more inclined to take seriously.
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International Litigation and the Quest for Reason-
ableness: Essays in Private International Law. By
Andreas F. Lowenfeld. Oxford, New York: Ox-
ford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1996.
Pp. xxvii, 239. Index. $65.
For much of this century, courts and scholars
have viewed public and private international law
as separate disciplines that address separate con-
cerns. Under this traditional view, public inter-
national law regulates relations among nations
inter se, and private international law regulates
transnational relations among private persons.
International law teaching and scholarship still
largely reflect this dichotomy. But today the di-
chotomy makes little sense. Modern "public"
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